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 Introduction
Two transformations are likely to dominate the first 
half of the twenty-first century. One is the shift in 
economic power from the West (North America and 
Western Europe) to the East (China and the East Asian 
production system). The second is the transition from 
a high to low carbon economy. The first shift is at an 
advanced stage; the second at an early stage. The 
purpose of this paper is to discuss how the first shift 
affects the second. 
Stern (2006) famously called climate change the 
greatest market failure of all time. Indeed, there is 
agreement that bringing about the low carbon 
transformation requires strategic intervention by the 
state. The problem is that the prospects for such 
intervention look bleak – at least in the West. Most 
Western states are either politically paralysed or 
financially bankrupt, or both. In 
contrast, the ‘Rising Powers’, in 
particular China, have ‘entrepreneurial 
states’ (Mazzucato 2011), declining 
levels of internal indebtedness and 
increasing foreign exchange reserves. 
What does this mean for the low 
carbon transformation? Will it make 
the transformation faster and cheaper? There are early 
signs that this might happen. For the past three years 
China has been the world’s number one investor in 
renewable energy and India has had the highest recent 
growth rate (BNEF 2012). This suggests an accelerating 
influence on the part of the rising powers. There is also 
a cost reducing influence; China has slashed the price of 
solar panels and pushed down the price of wind turbines. 
The problem is that China (and to a lesser extent the 
other rising powers) is also responsible for most of the 
recent increases in carbon emissions.
So there is no easy answer to the question of how 
the global power shift affects the low carbon 
transformation. In fact the question is not answerable 
in a rigorous sense for two inter-related reasons. First, 
the transition from high to low carbon economy is 
influenced by many factors, so there is an attribution 
(and time lag) problem. Second, both the shift in power 
from West to East and the transition from high to low 
carbon growth have several dimensions and sectoral 
variations. Such methodological problems need to be 
acknowledged but would not be an excuse for running 
away from the question. 
This paper grapples with the question by 
concentrating on the Europe–China relationship and 
by exploring two dynamics, one economic and one 
political. On the economic side, it asks how the global 
power shift affects the cost and speed of the 
transformation and the distribution of the gains 
between Europe and China. On the political side it asks 
how the power shift affects the formation of 
transformative alliances and the likelihood of 
accelerating the transformation. In order to address 
these questions, Section 2 investigates the global wind 
energy industry and the changing power balance 
between Europe and China in this industry. Section 3 
then broadens the canvas; it shows how unpacking 
pathways and drivers of change can help us to get a 
grip on the political economy of the low carbon 
transformation in China and Europe. I will argue that it 
provides an analytical basis for more optimism than 
currently prevails in the climate change debate.
 CHINA HAS 
PUSHED DOWN 
THE PRICE OF WIND 
TURBINES. 
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 1 China’s rise in the wind power
 industry and its effects
For most of the first decade of this century there was 
a strong view in European government and business 
circles that the green economy provided a chance to 
re-establish European industrial eminence. We know 
now that – while Europe remains a technological 
leader in most low carbon sectors – China has been 
able to catch up quickly such that it has become the 
world’s biggest producer in some of these sectors, 
notably solar panels and wind turbines. This section 
shows this for the wind energy industry, drawing on 
research conducted jointly with Rasmus Lema, Axel 
Berger and Hong Song (Lema et al. 2011, 2012). It 
suggests that China’s rise is not just due to the shift in 
production power from West to East, and that it exerts 
influence on the global industry through a number of 
other corridors. It then asks what the implications are 
for the high to low carbon transition. 
1.1 The significance of China’s internal market 
China’s rise as a wind energy producer is closely related 
to the size and growth of its wind energy market. The 
global demand for wind energy is shifting to the East. 
Europe and the US have long been the dominant 
markets in the global wind power sector but by 
2010 more than half of newly installed wind power 
capacity was added outside these traditional markets. 
China has been the main driver of this development. 
Within only half a decade, China has managed to build 
the largest market for wind power in the world 
(see Figure 1.1). 
This rapid expansion is mainly a result of favourable 
government policies. These policies have created an 
internal market for wind power which would not have 
developed otherwise: the cost of generating wind 
power is still higher in most Chinese locations than 
that of fossil-fuel based energy. The main law supporting 
the shift towards wind energy was the Renewable 
Energy Law adopted in 2005 and amended in 2009. 
Its aim was to increase the share of renewable energies, 
wind in particular, in China’s energy mix as well as to 
support the domestic renewable energy industry (Li 
et al. 2010). The amendment of 2009 requires grid 
companies to purchase a certain proportion – specified 
by further regulations – of renewable energy and 
empowers government agencies to enforce this target 
through a penalty system.
Figure 1.1 Cumulative installed wind power capacity, 1995–2010 (MW)
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Table 1.1 Global top ten turbine manufacturers 2005 and 2010
2005 2010
Company Share Origin Company Share Origin
1. Vestas 27.9% EU 1. Vestas 14.8% EU
2. GE Wind 17.7% US 2. Sinovel 11.1% CN
3. Enercon 13.2% EU 3. GE Wind Power 9.6% US
4. Gamesa 12.9% EU 4. Goldwind 9.5% CN
5. Suzlon 6.1% IN 5. Enercon 7.2% EU
6. Siemens 5.5% EU 6. Suzlon 6.9% IN
7. Repower 3.1% EU 7. Dongfang Electric 6.7% CN
8. Nordex 2.6% EU 8. Gamesa 6.6% EU
9. Ecotécnia 2.1% EU 9. Siemens WP 5.9% EU
10. Mitsubishi 2.0% JP 10. United power 4.2% CN
Others 5.0% Others 17.5%
Note: World market shares
Source: BTM (2006, 2011)
1.2 The rise of China as a wind 
power producer
For most of the first decade of this century, European 
firms dominated the global wind turbine industry but 
China has caught up rapidly and is now number one 
producer in the world. One of the reasons why the 
Chinese wind turbine industry has been able to develop 
so fast is that firms have grown out of other segments 
of the diverse industrial base. The leading firms 
emerged out of large heavy machinery manufacturers 
and utility firms that had capabilities in key fields 
related to manufacturing as well as in large-scale 
project management relevant for deployment. Almost 
all segments of the wind 
power value chain have been 
localised in China. There is now 
an effective supply base 
catering to all elements of the 
manufacturing value chain.
The speed and depth of this 
build up was fostered by public 
policies. In addition to the 
demand-side support policies of the Chinese 
government, the ‘local content’ requirement played an 
important role. This policy, enacted in 2003, facilitated 
the localisation of large parts of the value chain. 
The rise of China as a wind turbine producer has led 
to a change in the pecking order of global lead firms. 
The period of most rapid change was 2005–2010. 
Table 1 shows the size and speed of change. While 
there was no Chinese firm in the top 10 in 2005, there 
were four by 2010. The leading Chinese firms Goldwind 
(2006), Sinovel (2007), Dongfang (2009) and United 
Power (2010) made their way into the top-ten list 
during this period. This meant that the Chinese wind 
turbine industry collectively had higher sales than those 
of any other nation by 2010.
What does all this mean for European firms? 
Maintaining a strong presence in China has been a 
priority for leading foreign firms, since they expect 
continued demand in future, even though the market 
is crowded at present. There is also agreement in 
general and among Chinese policymakers that China 
will need to give more emphasis to quality as the sector 
matures, and that European firms will play an important 
role in raising quality and reliability.
While the European and Chinese turbine 
manufacturers compete head-on, European suppliers 
of components and services often cooperate with 
Chinese turbine manufacturers. Some European 
suppliers have established subsidiaries which provide 
small, specialised components and services in fields 
such as electric control systems, hydraulics, oil filter 
systems and gears. These suppliers are growing more 
important as the Chinese manufacturers seek to 
upgrade the quality of their products. In a few cases, 
there are also alliances for producing large components; 
for example the European blade supplier LM is working 
with Goldwind, Sinovel, Dongfang and Envision. Thus, 
in contrast to European turbine producers, many 
European component suppliers are gaining market 
shares in China. 
In summary, the combination of a rapidly growing 
market in China and a slowly growing market in Europe 
has forced the traditional leading European makers of 
turbines and components to concentrate their efforts 
on the Chinese market. While Chinese regulations 
continue to favour Chinese firms, European firms in 
China have been able to grow more in the area of 
components than in the complete turbine market. 
 ALMOST ALL 
SEGMENTS OF THE WIND 
POWER VALUE CHAIN 
HAVE BEEN LOCALISED 
IN CHINA. 
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1.3 Is China becoming an 
innovation power in the wind 
industry?
One of the main conclusions from the previous section 
is that China is catching up with the old leaders in wind 
power. Whereas China needed 20 to 30 years to reach 
a world-class level of production in other sectors such 
as electronics (Ernst 2009), it was able to close the gap 
in wind power production capability in only ten years. 
The question of whether China is also building up 
significant innovation capability in this sector is 
controversial. Some argue that China relies on licensing 
from abroad and question whether China can innovate 
on its own. Our research suggests that the build up of 
Chinese innovation capability is now proceeding fast 
(Lema et al. 2012). 
International technology transfer has been an 
important source of technological capacity in wind 
turbine development in China. The option of drawing 
on the established design and engineering capabilities 
of overseas firms has been a key to the Chinese success 
story (Lewis 2007 and 2011). Licensing agreements 
have been an effective means of gaining a foothold in 
the industry and have established a basis for innovative 
improvements of the transferred technology. 
In the last few years, technology transfer has shifted 
from traditional mechanisms (e.g. FDI, trade and 
licensing) to joint design and R&D collaboration (Lema 
and Lema 2012). At the same time, European lead firms 
have begun to shift their own innovation activities to 
China. For example, Vestas opened its first Chinese 
R&D centre in Beijing in 2010 to undertake work in 
areas such as high voltage engineering, aerodynamics, 
new material and software development. 
Chinese turbine manufacturers have adopted 
innovation strategies that combine internal 
development with heavy reliance on sourcing external 
knowledge from Europe (Lema and Lema 2012 and 
Lewis 2011). The organisational decomposition of the 
innovation process seems to have played a major role 
in this process (Schmitz and Strambach 2009). The 
European lead firms collaborate with small turbine 
design houses and other engineering firms and it is 
these highly specialised smaller firms that have made 
their technologies and services readily available on 
the market. This has opened up opportunities for 
engaging in turbine design licensing and R&D 
collaboration with Chinese firms. However, the 
change was also driven from within the Chinese 
companies, particularly by acquiring European firms 
and establishing R&D subsidiaries in established 
knowledge clusters. This strategy seems to have been 
effective, helping Chinese companies to build up their 
innovation capabilities quickly.
1.4 Financing power: strategic 
advantage?
We deal with Financing Power last because it is the 
area least explored up until now – but it could well 
represent China’s main strategic advantage. The 
investment requirements in wind energy are high, and 
the time horizons are long. Being able to finance such 
investments is critical.
Project finance may become an important element 
of China’s ‘mode of entry’ into foreign markets. While 
the Western firms are ‘strapped for cash’, the Chinese 
government and Chinese companies are flush with 
funds. Sinovel, for example, has a US$ 6.5 billion line 
of credit from government-owned Chinese banks 
 A worker 
assembles 
wind turbine 
rotors at 
Gansu Jinfeng 
Wind Power 
Equipment Co. 
Ltd. in Jiuquan.
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(Zeller and Bradsher 2010). Other firms also have strong 
relations with Chinese financial institutions and have 
secured significant lines of credit for the purpose of 
expanding sales outside China. China Exim Bank has 
injected capital into Ming Yang and Goldwind to 
support its expansion into the US and the EU.
This opens up the possibility of an export model that 
has not been directly utilised by European firms – the 
twinning of wind farm project finance and turbine 
exports. Chinese manufacturing firms are thus indirectly 
providing credit to projects that would perhaps 
otherwise not be financed by financial institutions in 
export markets – due to the modest record of Chinese 
turbines to date. This financing element may thus help 
Chinese firms to get a foot in the door in the US and 
European markets. Future research will need to show 
how relevant such project financing is. The relevance 
of supplier credit for China’s competitiveness in the 
wind-power sector is a particularly acute issue at the 
current time when much of the Western world is 
suffering from a credit crunch. 
The differences in financing power might also help 
explain differences in governmental action. In order 
to promote the uptake of renewable energy, 
governments have provided financial incentives 
through feed-in tariffs and other instruments. In 
Western countries, governments have come under 
severe pressure to reduce such incentives in the course 
of prioritising financial austerity. This has slowed down 
the growth of Western markets while Chinese 
markets have continued to grow rapidly (though 
unevenly between sectors). Since the Chinese market 
is not a level playing field, this has benefited Chinese 
industry above all. The relevance (or not) of this 
differential in the government’s financial room to 
manoeuvre is an important issue for future research. 
1.5 Implications for the low 
carbon transformation
There is little doubt that China’s rise as a major 
competitor in the wind energy sector has exerted a 
down pressure on costs. By 2010 the price gap between 
European and Chinese turbines was in the order of 27 
per cent (BNEF 2010: 9) and it has grown further since. 
Whether this price differential has accelerated the 
deployment of wind energy is hard to tell. While price 
plays a big role, buyers also consider reliability and 
adaptability to local conditions. These are areas in which 
European producers are stronger.1 
While it is too soon to tell whether China’s rise in 
the wind energy industry has had a major effect on the 
low carbon transformation globally, it is clear that the 
employment and income benefits from investing in the 
low carbon industry are no longer concentrated in the 
West. Such benefits are being reaped increasingly 
by China. 
So far, the biggest influence in the wind energy 
sector comes from China’s market power. Western 
firms seek to operate in the large Chinese market, but 
have had to yield to government-imposed conditions 
which favour Chinese producers. Benefiting from this 
protection, Chinese enterprises have been able to 
invest and learn very fast, attaining a level of producer 
power which has brought about major changes in the 
top ten international turbine makers. 
While the combined impact of Chinese market and 
producer power is already visible, the lead firms are 
also beginning to exert influence through their 
innovation and financing power. We cannot, however, 
conclude that China’s advances are or will all be at the 
cost of Western companies. Press headlines which 
emphasise competition or conflict between Western 
and Chinese companies often fail to capture the 
complexity of the current situation. While competition 
among lead firms is increasing, there are also prospects 
for growth of inter-firm collaboration along the value 
chain (Lema et al. 2011). China, Europe and the world 
can benefit from such collaboration in order to reduce 
technological complexity, drive down costs, improve 
quality, and make wind power a more effective energy 
option for the world.
More generally, this section has shown that much 
can be learnt from adopting a sectoral approach (even 
if further disaggregation by stages in the value chain 
is sometimes needed). A series of such sectoral studies 
(for example, for solar energy, electric vehicles, energy 
saving building materials, and other sectors) would be 
very useful in order to understand how the global 
power shift affects the low carbon transformation 
and the inter-country distribution of low carbon 
benefits (in terms of low carbon jobs). Such studies 
would probably show big sectoral differences in the 
extent and speed of power shifts and transitions. Our 
hunch is that – in spite of sectoral differences – the 
changes observed would be in the same direction in 
the sense that China: (a) accounts for an increasing 
part of the global green economy; (b) lowers the costs 
of going green, and; (c) speeds up deployment of 
green technology. 
The main problem with this kind of sectoral approach 
is that it would not tell us much about the forces which 
work against the low-carbon transformation, in 
particular the fossil-fuel and related industries. Broadly 
speaking for each billion of low carbon investment 
there is a trillion of high carbon investment – in West 
and East. Up-to-date sectoral studies of these fossil-
fuel and related sectors would of course help – in 
particular if one could compare investment, technology 
and emission trends. But slicing up the real world in 
terms of sectors would probably not provide us with 
the killer insights needed to understand the forces 
which bring about and oppose the low carbon 
transformation. The next section therefore experiments 
with an approach which seeks to achieve just that. 
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2 Experimenting with a political 
economy approach
This paper seeks to understand how the shift of 
economic power from West to East influences the 
low carbon transformation. Stirling (2009) and 
Leach et al. (2010) stress that there is a diversity of 
‘pathways to sustainability’. For an initial step 
we suggest distinguishing between the carbon 
transformation from below and above. But we can 
go further and unpack the process using the categories 
in Table 2.1. 
2.1 Drivers of the low carbon 
transformation 
Over the last decade, most attention has been given 
to the left side of the table (read it vertically). The 
ambition was to bring economic development within 
the planetary boundaries by pursuing an approach 
which was top down, had a global scale, was (supposed 
to be) led by the North, and driven forward by public 
actors that recognised the need to mitigate climate 
change. This global governance approach has failed, 
as shown by successive climate conferences (COPS) 
and the sustainability conferences in Rio. Given the 
questions driving this paper, we need to recognise that 
the shift of economic power from the West to the 
East has made it more difficult, rather than easier, to 
reach a global deal on reducing carbon emissions. The 
West is responsible for the accumulation of carbon 
emissions of the past, whereas China is responsible for 
most of the recent increases in carbon emissions. This 
struggle between historic and current responsibilities 
is at the heart of the deadlock in global negotiations. 
In the meantime however, progress was made on 
the right side of the table: using bottom up approaches 
and relying on local initiatives in which civic actors play 
a major role. There are many examples in the West, in 
particular at City level (OECD 2010); but in China, too, 
local initiatives have played an important role (Harrison 
and Kostka 2012). An important difference between 
the political dynamics in China and Europe concerns 
the role of the civic sector. Whereas in Europe, NGOs 
were influential in promoting the climate change 
agenda and contributing to practical ways forward, 
they have been comparatively weak and have had less 
influence in China.2 This comparison, however, only 
captures half the picture. In Europe, civil society has 
played a dual role role in the low carbon transformation, 
promoting it on the one hand and slowing it down 
on the other (Schnelle and Voigt 2012). There has 
been considerable local resistance to the establishment 
of new wind farms and of transmission lines. ‘Not in 
my backyard’ (NIMBY) initiatives – in spite of their 
micro origins – can have 
considerable macro effects. 
In contrast, public authorities 
in China have been able to 
push through their projects 
with scant consideration to 
local opposition.3
At the national level, 
substantial progress was 
made in both Europe and 
China, with governments 
implementing green industrial policies and the private 
sector making big investments in renewable energy 
and other low carbon technologies. The two European 
countries with the biggest progress are Denmark (wind 
energy) and Germany (solar and wind energy). Spain, 
Britain and other European countries have also 
promoted the development and deployment of low 
carbon technologies. However, progress made at the 
national level risks running out of steam. While most 
of the investment comes from the private sector, 
subsidies from the public sector are essential in this 
early stage of the low carbon transformation. This 
public support has come under attack with arguments 
that the public sector (or the tax payer) cannot afford 
such subsidies, and that regaining financial solvency has 
priority. Arguments that fostering new green industries 
 AN IMPORTANT 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
IN CHINA AND EUROPE 
CONCERNS THE ROLE OF 
THE CIVIC SECTOR. 
Table 2.1 Accelerating the low carbon transformation
Approach Top Down Bottom Up
Level Global National Local
Location North Rising Powers South
Actor Public Private Civic
Motive Climate Change Energy Security Competitiveness Green Jobs
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helps to promote growth, jobs and public revenue are 
drowned out by opposing forces. Political paralysis 
prevails in much of Europe (and USA). This, in a nutshell, 
is the European situation, even if there are variations 
between countries and regions. 
In contrast, China continues to storm ahead. Its 
government is not encumbered by national or foreign 
debt and it has the ability to act. A good example of 
its ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Mazzucato 2011) is the 
support for the solar energy industry. When European 
demand for Chinese photovoltaic panels declined in 
2009, the Chinese government quickly launched a 
programme pushing up the deployment of such panels 
within China (Fischer 2012) in order to ensure that the 
build-up of this new industry could continue. The 
government is also providing substantial resources for 
developing new low carbon technology.
A vertical reading of Table 2.1 thus helps to categorise 
existing approaches: global top down, local bottom up 
and national-level initiatives (mainly top down but 
building on bottom up support). On their own, none 
of them will achieve the low carbon transformation. 
Most observers would agree that these approaches 
need to be combined and that multi-level governance 
is needed. But which force can bring this about? Recall 
that this is the first transformation in history that has 
to be achieved with purpose and against a deadline. In 
other words, the task of 
accelerating the process takes 
centre stage. But where can this 
acceleration come from? 
Here we turn again to Table 
2.1, in particular the last two 
lines which focus on the range 
of relevant actors and the 
motives of these actors. Analysis 
of these actors and motives needs to take four critical 
steps: (1) recognise that no single actor has the resources 
to bring about the low carbon transformation; (2) 
recognise that within government, within civil society 
and within business there are actors seeking to block 
or slow down the green transformation; (3) attention 
needs to focus on supportive alliances across these 
categories; and (4) including actors with different 
motives helps to understand and accelerate the low 
carbon transformation. The transformative alliance 
becomes the central concept. The next section suggests 
that this is a critical step to take, first for understanding 
what goes on within countries and second for seeing 
new possibilities of joint action between countries. 
2.2 The transformative alliance
Bringing about the green transformation requires 
resources of different types: expertise, money, 
organisational capacity, and legitimacy (one could add 
leadership). These resources tend to be distributed over 
a range of public, private and civic actors. It is therefore 
useful to concentrate on alliances between actors in 
government and business and civil society. Who then 
can be considered a member of such alliance? Is the 
deciding criterion motivation or action? While it is 
tempting to let motivation count and opt for an 
alliance of the like-minded, this is a limiting step to 
take. There is a range of actors that can support the 
low carbon transformation through their action (such 
as investing, providing expertise, lobbying) but their 
motives for doing so can differ greatly. The bottom line 
of Table 2.1 suggests several motives other than 
mitigating climate change: securing energy, building 
competitive green industries, and fostering green jobs. 
In other words, there is a potential for alliances that 
include actors whose priority is not ecological 
sustainability. This can be a ‘game changer’ in the 
dynamics of the transformation. It is supported by 
historical research which shows actor groups with 
differing intentions advancing the change in a specific 
direction (WGBU 2011:85 drawing on research by 
Osterhammel).
Such alliances seem to have been important in both 
China and Europe. In Denmark, for example, the 
experimentation with wind energy received substantial 
support from politicians and business leaders concerned 
with energy security – in the wake of various oil crises. 
Actors with environmental motivations played a role 
at the start and increased in importance over time but 
they were never sufficient. Actors motivated by the 
chance to build a globally competitive hub (for providing 
wind energy solutions and creating highly paid jobs) 
have played a big role. In China, such alliances were 
equally if not more relevant. China’s massive investment 
in renewable energy was not driven primarily by 
concerns with global climate change but by concerns 
to secure energy and ambitions to build new 
competitive sectors. Research in progress – conducted 
jointly with Chinese researchers – indicates that these 
were major concerns in both Chinese government and 
industry. 
The relevance of alliances is confirmed by the 
research of Harrison and Kostka (2012) on the local 
politics of climate change in China and India. ‘In both 
countries the ability to build and sustain coalitions is 
central to the effectiveness and sustainability of climate 
change policy. For various reasons, state strategies in 
China and India have focused on the need to bring 
different parties with otherwise divergent interests on 
board to build a coalition in favour of climate mitigation 
measures’ (Harrison and Kostka 2012: 5). 
The composition of such coalitions is likely to vary, 
depending on the specific policy or project in question, 
but economic interests concerned with securing 
energy and building new competitive industries tend 
to be major players. While not surprising in itself, it 
questions the discourse which pitches economic 
growth against environmental sustainability – so 
popular in many parts of the world (Dubasch 2009). 
 THIS IS THE FIRST 
TRANSFORMATION IN 
HISTORY THAT HAS TO 
BE ACHIEVED AGAINST 
A DEADLINE. 
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Policies which foster structural transformation promote 
rather than hinder economic growth. 
This is not to suggest that there are only winners. 
Far from it. Some stand to lose from the transformation. 
In the early stage of the low carbon transformation, 
the losers might even outnumber the winners. 
Whatever the numbers, they are agents of resistance 
and they need to be analysed in the same way as the 
agents of change. The opponents also seek alliances. 
The opposing forces are not necessarily against de-
carbonisation as such but they are fighting for their 
jobs and/or protecting their assets which are tied to 
fossil fuel and related sectors. Recent history suggests 
that they are fighting with all means at their disposal 
– as shown for example in the attempts to discredit 
scientists showing connections between rising 
carbon emissions and climate chaos (Blasberg and 
Kohlenberg 2012).
To return to our overall argument, focusing on 
alliances is essential for understanding and fostering 
the low carbon transformation. Such alliances are best 
seen as vehicles for bundling diverse interests for a 
particular purpose such as influencing legislation, 
policies, or projects. In order to be effective, analytical 
and political work needs to deal with both agents of 
change (prospective winners) and agents of resistance 
(prospective losers).
Putting such alliances centre stage is not sufficient. 
We need to be able to distinguish between alliances 
of different types. At one end there is the strategic 
alliance based on joint action. At the other end there 
is the mere alignment of interest without co-
ordination between the parties. Both can be transitional 
(short term) or enduring (long term). All types can be 
instrumental in overcoming (or causing) collective 
inaction. 
2.3 The future
The question driving this paper is how the low carbon 
transformation is affected by the global power shift 
from West to East. For most of the last 40 years, 
China’s economic transformation was driven forward 
by an alignment of interests favouring rapid economic 
growth. In recent years, environmental concerns have 
received increasing attention, in particular in central 
government. However, this cannot explain the massive 
recent investment in renewable energy. Our ongoing 
research suggests that concerns with securing energy 
for consumers and enterprises and building new 
competitive industries were also major drivers. In other 
words, the analysis of alliances is highly relevant for 
understanding recent changes in China. 
As regards the future, the question is whether this 
low carbon alliance will be strong enough to curtail the 
planned expansion in coal-fired power plants. This will 
probably depend on the linkages between industry and 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party. A 
research project showing the formal and informal links 
which members of the Central Committee have with 
the fossil fuel and renewable industries would tell us a 
lot about the future of China … and the world. 
While we can only dream of conducting such 
research, we can anticipate that China’s rise in the low 
carbon industries will have an effect on the low carbon 
alliances in Europe. Because of the strong competition 
from China, some European firms have pulled out of 
the solar power industry. Siemens is the most prominent 
example – widely reported in the media. Competition 
from China has also contributed to the problems 
encountered by Vestas, Denmark’s iconic wind power 
company. Vestas is increasingly 
sourcing services and material 
inputs from abroad and might 
even be taken over by an Asian 
firm (Interviews and Press 
Reports). While still world 
number one, it has become 
less Danish. The point to be 
made here is that it becomes 
more difficult to strengthen 
the low carbon alliance in 
Germany, Denmark or other European countries if 
most of the resulting jobs arise in China. What is 
excellent for the world – namely cheaper technologies 
from China – might only be a second best for European 
countries that seek to produce the new technologies. 
In other words, growing green power in China might 
weaken green alliances in Europe – if the dominant 
narrative is one of competition and zero sum games. 
Alliance thinking could however help to build a very 
different narrative – one which does not set green 
China against green Europe but green versus brown 
irrespective of location and passport (green meaning 
low carbon and brown standing for high carbon). This 
would be especially important for progress in the global 
governance arena. Twenty years of global climate 
negotiations have yielded very little because the debate 
was conducted in terms of developed versus developing 
countries, established versus emerging powers, USA 
versus China, Europe versus China, etc. The governmental 
representatives of these countries or blocks of countries 
worked with narratives which pitched them against 
each other – even though decomposing the picture 
would immediately show that there are considerable 
alignments of interests and conflicts of interest across 
the (blocks of) countries which they claimed to 
represent. A big industry consisting of the media, 
research centres and NGOs bought into these false 
narratives and prolonged the agony. 
Alliance thinking of the kind proposed here suggests 
a practical and more promising way forward: selective 
agreements among those who concentrate on the 
opportunities rather than the cost. The free rider 
dilemma, which holds back the global negotiations, is 
a cost-induced dilemma. Focusing on opportunities 
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does not mean ignoring this dilemma but opens up 
new ways of thinking and acting. A ‘coalition of the 
willing and winning’3 can trigger new political and 
economic dynamics. Current attempts to forge an 
international ‘low carbon club’ (Messner and Morgan 
2013) might be one way of putting this approach into 
practice. A low carbon club built around a China–
Europe axis would be a powerful way of pulling the 
global debate out of its near-paralysis. For the time 
being however it remains – what Germans would call 
– Zukunftsmusik (music of the future). Turning it into 
reality would require a narrative built around the 
proposition that the opposition from high carbon 
sectors does more harm than competition within the 
low carbon sectors. 
To conclude, raising investment and advancing 
collective action for the low carbon transformation has 
been difficult at all levels: global, national and local. 
Progress is held back partly because the units of analysis 
are mis-specified. The debate continues to pitch public 
against private (or civic) sectors, developed against 
developing countries, or rising powers against sinking 
powers. Actors supporting (and opposing) the low 
carbon transformation can be found in each of these 
categories. The analytical and practical challenge lies in 
identifying and forging alliances across these divides. 
Such focus on alliances offers the best hope we have 
to accelerate the low carbon transformation within 
West and East and across the divide. 
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